SECRET/

5 April 1973

25X1	MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Far East Division	
25X1	SUBJECT : Memorandum to General Scowcroft	
25X1	1. The attached memo, signed by Bill Colby for the Director, landed on my desk prior to its dispatch. I discussed it with and found that he from his experience on the NSC Staff shared my concern that in its present form it might strike the wrong note downtown.	25X1
	2. The memo is of course written and intended as simply a factual report explaining why it was inadvisable for us to add the new thought raised in Scowcroft's 21 March note through the exercise which had already been launched, particularly since statements emanating from the DRV itself indicated that Hanoi had already gotten the message. Given the taut nerves and general	25X1
	attitude downtown, our perfectly legitimate message is liable to be misinterpreted. Even though this was the last thing intended by the drafter, the recipient could construe the note as saying we did not do what we were asked to do but no damage was done thereby the chances of hypersensitivity on the part of his staff are very high.	25X1
	3. I would suggest a slight recasting to convey the following message:	

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25X1 25X1	a. Your 21 March request arrived after we had already	
25X1		
	c. Recent Hanoi pronouncements indicate that the North Vietnamese have already gotten the word.	
25X1	d. As soon as it is possible to do so we will reinforce Hanoi's	25X1
	appreciation through additional channels.	25X1
1	4. The above says the same thing but, tonally, is more "forward leaning," to coin a phrase. I talked to Colby about this and he has no problems with the proposed rejiggering.	
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	George A. Carver, Jr.	25X1
	Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs	* ************************************
	Attachment	

l - Memos to Kissinger file l - GAC Chrono